Fighting climate change: International attitudes toward climate policies
This paper studies how people across the world perceive and understand climate change
and climate policies, which factors determine their support for climate action, and what type …
and climate policies, which factors determine their support for climate action, and what type …
The political economics of green transitions
Reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases may be almost impossible without a green
transition—a substantial transformation of consumption and production patterns. To study …
transition—a substantial transformation of consumption and production patterns. To study …
Buy coal! A case for supply-side environmental policy
B Harstad - Journal of Political Economy, 2012 - journals.uchicago.edu
Free-riding is at the core of environmental problems. If a climate coalition reduces its
emissions, world prices change and nonparticipants typically emit more; they may also …
emissions, world prices change and nonparticipants typically emit more; they may also …
Participation and duration of environmental agreements
M Battaglini, B Harstad - Journal of Political Economy, 2016 - journals.uchicago.edu
We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in
which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible …
which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible …
Pledge-and-review bargaining: From Kyoto to Paris
B Harstad - The Economic Journal, 2023 - academic.oup.com
A tractable dynamic model of international climate policies is analysed. The choice of
bargaining game influences participation levels, emission quotas and technology …
bargaining game influences participation levels, emission quotas and technology …
[HTML][HTML] Cooperation in the climate commons
Climate change is a global externality that has proven difficult to address through formal
institutions alone due to the public good properties of climate change mitigation and the lack …
institutions alone due to the public good properties of climate change mitigation and the lack …
Climate contracts: A game of emissions, investments, negotiations, and renegotiations
B Harstad - Review of Economic Studies, 2012 - academic.oup.com
The paper presents a dynamic game where players contribute to a public bad, invest in
technologies, and write incomplete contracts. Despite the n+ 1 stocks in the model, the …
technologies, and write incomplete contracts. Despite the n+ 1 stocks in the model, the …
Bargaining and international environmental agreements
A Caparrós - Environmental and Resource Economics, 2016 - Springer
This article surveys game theoretic papers focused on the negotiation process that leads to
an International Environmental Agreement. Most of the papers considered apply bargaining …
an International Environmental Agreement. Most of the papers considered apply bargaining …
No country is an island. International cooperation and climate change
MM Ferrari, MS Pagliari - International Cooperation and Climate …, 2021 - papers.ssrn.com
In this paper we explore the cross-country implications of climate-related mitigation policies.
Specifically, we set up a two-country, two-sector (brown vs green) DSGE model with …
Specifically, we set up a two-country, two-sector (brown vs green) DSGE model with …
The dynamics of climate agreements
B Harstad - Journal of the European Economic Association, 2016 - academic.oup.com
This paper analyzes a framework in which countries over time pollute and invest in green
technologies. Without a climate treaty, the countries pollute too much and invest too little …
technologies. Without a climate treaty, the countries pollute too much and invest too little …