Recent developments in modern agri‐food markets have called into question the predictive
capability of the traditional models and tools used by agricultural economists to assess and …

We develop a general, tractable framework of multilateral vertical contracting, which places
no restriction on tariffs and fully accounts for their impact on downstream competition …

The paper studies the questions of why and when a supply chain should invest in a
traceability system that allows the identification of which supplier is responsible for quality …

We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream firms
(manufacturers) that produce differentiated goods and downstream firms (retailers) that …

Producers frequently provide retailers with financial incentives to secure product distribution.
These payments often take the form of vendor allowances: lump-sum transfers to retailers …

We study the contracts of 898 legal Finnish cartels. Cartels that exclusively allocate markets,
either geographically or in the product/production space, are dominant in manufacturing …

This paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction
between competing supply chains. We show that with observable contracts exclusive …

We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product
market. Buyer groups purchase inputs more economically. In a repeated game, abandoning …

Numerous recently uncovered cartels operated along the supply chain, with firms at one end
facilitating collusion at the other—hub-and-spoke arrangements. These cartels are hard to …

We investigate how the structure of the distribution channel affects tacit collusion between
manufacturers. When selling through a common retailer, we find—in contrast to the …