Communication and community enforcement

T Sugaya, A Wolitzky - Journal of Political Economy, 2021 - journals.uchicago.edu
We study the repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching, a canonical model of
community enforcement with decentralized information. We assume that (1) with small …

A few bad apples spoil the barrel: An Anti-folk Theorem for anonymous repeated games with incomplete information

T Sugaya, A Wolitzky - American Economic Review, 2020 - aeaweb.org
We study anonymous repeated games where players may be “commitment types” who
always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the …

[PDF][PDF] Cooperation in large societies

A Wolitzky - Advances in Economics and Econometrics, 12th …, 2022 - economics.mit.edu
I survey models of cooperation in large populations. Topics include repeated games with
public monitoring, random matching games, games on networks, infinitepopulation games …

A theory of multiplexity: Sustaining cooperation with multiple relations

C Cheng, W Huang, Y Xing - Available at SSRN 3811181, 2021 - papers.ssrn.com
People are embedded in multiple social relations. These relations are not isolated from each
other. Do different networks overlap and why? We focus on the following question: When an …

Cooperation and Balance in Signed Networks: A Model of Multiplex Formation

RP Kundu, S Pandey - Available at SSRN 4174703, 2022 - papers.ssrn.com
We propose a game theoretic model for multiplexity in signed networks through strategic
interactions amongst n players who are linked to each other in an existing (fixed) signed …

Wealth dynamics in communities

D Barron, Y Guo, B Reich - The Review of Economic Studies, 2023 - academic.oup.com
This article develops a model to explore how favour exchange influences wealth dynamics.
We identify a key obstacle to wealth accumulation: wealth crowds out favour exchange …

Substitutability in Favor Exchange

O Celebi - arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.10749, 2023 - arxiv.org
I introduce a favor exchange model where favors are substitutable and study bilateral
enforcement of cooperation. Without substitutability, the value of a relationship does not …

Facilitating Collusion with Spot-Price Contracting

JW Hatfield, R Lowery - Available at SSRN 4529677, 2023 - papers.ssrn.com
We investigate the competitive effects of spot-price contracting, in which a buyer and seller
contract to transact at a future date at the price prevailing in that market at that future date …

[PDF][PDF] Market and Non-Market Exchange and Market-Supporting Institutions

F Balmaceda - 2024 - lm2c2.cl
Does market exchange reduce participation in non-market exchange thus reducing overall
welfare? Some have argued that markets strengthen the necessary conditions for a vibrant …

[PDF][PDF] Substitutability of Favors and Bilateral Enforcement of Cooperation

O Celebi - 2022 - economics.mit.edu
I introduce a favor exchange model that allows players to rely on multiple partners to obtain
favors (ie, cooperation is substitutable) and study bilateral enforcement of cooperation …