We introduce a simple model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents
arrive and depart stochastically and the composition of the trade network depends …

Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly
matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient …

We study non-monetary markets where objects that arrive over time are allocated to unit-
demand agents with private types, such as in the allocation of public housing or deceased …

We study the optimal design of a queueing system when agents' arrival and servicing are
governed by a general Markov process. The designer of the system chooses entry and exit …

We study the efficacy of the donor-priority rule in promoting deceased organ donation under
blood-type compatibility constraints in both theory and the laboratory. Compared with an …

We study how to optimally match agents in a dynamic matching market with heterogeneous
match cardinalities and values. A network topology determines the feasible matches in the …

We study dynamic matching in a spatial setting. Drivers are distributed at random on some
interval. Riders arrive in some (possibly adversarial) order at randomly drawn points. The …

We propose a new matching algorithm--Unpaired kidney exchange--to tackle the problem of
double coincidence of wants without using money. The fundamental idea is that" memory" …

We consider a matching market where buyers and sellers arrive according to independent
Poisson processes at the same rate and independently abandon the market if not matched …

This chapter surveys the literature on dynamic matching markets, both its study of specific
market institutions and the allocations they can implement, and that of reduced-form solution …