Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …

This paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized school choice depend on the
assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of school …

Waitlists are often used to ration scarce resources, but the trade‐offs in designing these
mechanisms depend on agents' preferences. We study equilibrium allocations under …

Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly
matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient …

A main aim of kidney exchange programs (KEPs) is to maximize the number of transplants
within a pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs by exchanging donors. A KEP involving …

Over the last 15 years, kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase
transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and full benefits from exchange …

Nowadays there are several countries running independent kidney exchange programmes
(KEPs). These programmes allow a patient with kidney failure, having a willing healthy but …

We study dynamic matching in an infinite-horizon stochastic market. Although all agents are
potentially compatible with each other, some are hard to match and others are easy to …

Earlier in my career, prevalent approaches in the emerging field of market design largely
represented the experiences and perspectives of leaders who were commissioned to design …

We study the welfare and human capital impacts of colleges'(non) participation in Chile's
centralized higher-education platform, leveraging administrative data and two policy …