[引用][C] The economics of self-employment and entrepreneurship
SC Parker - 2004 - books.google.com
As self-employment and entrepreneurship become increasingly important in our modern
economies, Simon C. Parker provides a timely, definitive and comprehensive overview of …
economies, Simon C. Parker provides a timely, definitive and comprehensive overview of …
Do banks ration credit to new enterprises? And should governments intervene?
SC Parker - Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Do banks deny credit to new start–ups? The presumption that they do has motivated
government intervention in several forms, including publicly backed loan guarantee …
government intervention in several forms, including publicly backed loan guarantee …
The welfare implications of costly monitoring in the credit market: A note
B Xu - The Economic Journal, 2000 - academic.oup.com
Welfare Implications of Costly Monitoring in the Credit Market: a Note | The Economic
Journal | Oxford Academic Skip to Main Content Advertisement Oxford Academic Journals …
Journal | Oxford Academic Skip to Main Content Advertisement Oxford Academic Journals …
12 Asymmetric information, investment finance and real business cycles
B Hillier, T Worrall - The New Macroeconomics: Imperfect …, 1995 - books.google.com
12 Asymmetric information, investment finance and real business cycles Page 261 12
Asymmetric information, investment finance and real business cycles Brian Hillier and Tim …
Asymmetric information, investment finance and real business cycles Brian Hillier and Tim …
[图书][B] Asymmetrische Information und Finanzierungsstruktur
V Schubert - 2021 - elibrary.duncker-humblot.com
Kapitalgeber sind in aller Regel schlechter informiert als Kapitalnehmer. Die aus dieser
asymmetrischen Informationsverteilung resultierenden Probleme haben auf …
asymmetrischen Informationsverteilung resultierenden Probleme haben auf …
Financial intermediation and capital investment with costly monitoring
G Di Giorgio - International Review of Economics & Finance, 2002 - Elsevier
This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy where the
process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both …
process of financial intermediation is characterized by costly state verification. Both …
Costly state verification and optimal investment
B Mukhopadhyay - Journal of Economics and Finance, 2002 - Springer
We model a lender-borrower relationship in a CSV framework. The project available with the
firm is characterized by first-order stochastic dominance. The lender audits the borrower to …
firm is characterized by first-order stochastic dominance. The lender audits the borrower to …
Gouvernance en Afrique: la théorie générale de la gouvernance économique
SA Djelhi-Yahot - 2017 - torrossa.com
Depuis le début des années 1990, les institutions de Bretton Woods, particulièrement la
BIRD, dénoncent la mauvaise gestion des deniers publics dans la plupart des pays en …
BIRD, dénoncent la mauvaise gestion des deniers publics dans la plupart des pays en …
[PDF][PDF] Essays on Optimal Contracts with Costly State Verification
M Crescenzi - 2013 - iris.luiss.it
The present dissertation collects two essays on the theory of optimal contracts in presence of
a Costly State Verification Technology. In the first essay (Chapter 2), we extend the standard …
a Costly State Verification Technology. In the first essay (Chapter 2), we extend the standard …
Mitigating Judgment Proofness: Information Acquisition vs. Extended Liability
J Anyangah - Review of Law & Economics, 2012 - degruyter.com
We present a simple lending model of judgment proof borrowers with private information
and heterogeneous wealth, where large and small lenders coexist. Lenders subject would …
and heterogeneous wealth, where large and small lenders coexist. Lenders subject would …