We study the effect of politics on the distribution of intergovernmental grants. We consider a
model where local government officials lobby the central government who in turn distributes …

We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when
voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from …

Obstruction is a time‐honored tradition in legislative politics. In many cases, obstruction can
be foreseen to be ultimately unsuccessful, and in some of these cases, purely costly even to …

Why do some legislators take fewer positions on roll-call votes than others? Do these
omissions occur by chance, or is it possible that certain legislators avoid taking positions …

Roll‐call votes are widely employed to infer the ideological proclivities of legislators.
However, many roll‐call matrices are characterized by high levels of nonresponse. Under …

Why do legislators choose to vote 'Abstain'instead of 'Yea'or 'Nay'? Is it because they shy
away from taking sides when facing competing demands? We address this question by …

Tools dedicated to inferring the ideological leanings of legislators from observed votes—
techniques such as NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) or the item‐response‐theory …

A legislator's duty is to vote on legislation, yet legislators routinely miss votes. Existing
studies of absenteeism have focused on the US Congress, producing useful but partial …

This paper analyzes the effect of population size on politicalparticipation and allocative
efficiency. Increasing populationis generally found to reduce political participation. However …

The participatory model of management for natural resources, particularly water, rapidly
became a global phenomenon in the early part of the 21st century. In many developing and …