Following Gary Watson, a range of Strawsonian theorists of moral responsibility understand
the praise-and blame-manifesting reactive attitudes to be 'incipient forms of …

Philosophers often characterize discourse in general as aiming at some sort of convergence
(in beliefs, plans, dispositions, feelings, etc.), and many views about aesthetic discourse in …

Request is curious. A moment's reflection reveals as much. For example, we often say such
things as “Can't hurt to ask” and “It's okay to say no,” yet we also frequently vex over whether …

How do we change the normative landscape by making requests? It will be argued that by
making requests we create reasons for action if and only if certain conditions are met. We …

Upon doing something generous for someone with whom you are close, some kind of
reciprocity may be appropriate. But it often seems wrong to actually request reciprocity. This …

I ask you to X. You now have a reason to X. My request gave you a reason. How? One
unpopular theory is the epistemic account, according to which requests do not create any …

A lineage of prominent philosophers who have discussed the second-person relation can be
regarded as advancing structural accounts. They posit that the second-person relation …

This paper defends the epistemic account of the normativity of requests. The epistemic
account says that a request does not create any reasons and thus does not have any special …

It is common to think that our intimates are required to help us. But it can be problematic to
appeal to certain kinds of facts (eg, previous favors or prudentially relevant facts) in order to …

According to the epistemic account of request normativity, a request gives us reasons by
revealing normatively relevant information. The information is normative, not the request …