Strategic analysis of auctions
R Wilson - Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 1992 - Elsevier
Publisher Summary This chapter describes several forms of auctions, presents the
formulations used in the main models, reviews some of the general results and empirical …
formulations used in the main models, reviews some of the general results and empirical …
Strategyproof social choice
S Barberà - Handbook of social choice and welfare, 2011 - Elsevier
Strategyproof Social Choice - ScienceDirect Skip to main contentSkip to article Elsevier
logo Journals & Books Search RegisterSign in View PDF Download full volume Search …
logo Journals & Books Search RegisterSign in View PDF Download full volume Search …
[图书][B] Public goods: A survey of experimental research
JO Ledyard - 1994 - degruyter.com
Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in delicate
experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design …
experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design …
The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes
E Budish - Journal of Political Economy, 2011 - journals.uchicago.edu
This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …
[图书][B] Einführung in die Spieltheorie
Wir haben die Möglichkeit einer weiteren Auflage des Buches genutzt, den Text
leserfreundlicher zu gestalten, den Sach-und Personenindex zu überarbeiten und neuere …
leserfreundlicher zu gestalten, den Sach-und Personenindex zu überarbeiten und neuere …
The implementation of social choice rules: Some general results on incentive compatibility
P Dasgupta, P Hammond… - The Review of Economic …, 1979 - academic.oup.com
We shall assume that the objectives of a society are embodied in a certain social choice
rule. A social choice rule (SCR) selects a set of feasible social states for each possible …
rule. A social choice rule (SCR) selects a set of feasible social states for each possible …
Rational expectations, information acquisition, and competitive bidding
PR Milgrom - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1981 - JSTOR
Most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation, and
naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable. In this paper, a …
naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable. In this paper, a …
Markov perfect industry dynamics with many firms
We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)‐style
dynamic models of imperfect competition. We define a new equilibrium concept that we call …
dynamic models of imperfect competition. We define a new equilibrium concept that we call …
[图书][B] The double auction market: institutions, theories, and evidence
D Friedman - 2018 - books.google.com
The double auction market: institutions, theories, and evidence Page 1 THE DOUBLE AUCTION
MARKET INSTITUTIONS, THEORIES, AND EVIDENCE EDITED BY Daniel Friedman John Rust …
MARKET INSTITUTIONS, THEORIES, AND EVIDENCE EDITED BY Daniel Friedman John Rust …
Straightforward individual incentive compatibility in large economies
PJ Hammond - The Review of Economic Studies, 1979 - academic.oup.com
The problem of incentive compatibility has recently received much attention. In order to
allocate resources well, one needs to know something about the characteristics ofthe agents …
allocate resources well, one needs to know something about the characteristics ofthe agents …