The paper examines how pre‐play communication between players with partial credibility
affects the ensuing strategic interaction. We consider an environment where players are …

We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the
players to attempt commiting to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful …

We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient
delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral …

We study a policy-motivated principal choosing a representative to bargain over one-
dimensional policy. The principal can constrain extremist proposers by (i) shifting (de facto) …

We analyze a multilateral war of attrition game with majority rule. A chair and two competing
players decide how to split one unit of surplus over continuous time. Each player has an …

Peliteoria analysoi rationaalista vuorovaikutteista päätöksentekoa, jossa osapuolilla voi olla
ristiriitaisia intressejä ja kunkin toiminta vaikuttaa paitsi omaan myös toisten hyvinvointiin …