Researchers' interest in monopsony has increased in recent years. This article reviews the
accumulating evidence that employers have considerable monopsony power. It summarizes …

Labor markets are not perfectly competitive: Monopsony power enables employers to pay
workers less than the marginal revenue product of labor. We review three theoretical …

A product market is concentrated when a few firms dominate the market. Similarly, a labor
market is concentrated when a few firms dominate hiring in the market. Using data from the …

We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with
differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by …

We analyze the effect of local-level labor market concentration on wages. Using plant-level
US Census data during 1978–2016, we find that:(i) local-level employer concentration …

We quantify the importance of imperfect competition in the US labor market by estimating the
size of labor market rents earned by American firms and workers. We construct a matched …

We synthesize two related literatures on firm-level drivers of wage inequality. Studies of rent
sharing that use matched worker-firm data find elasticities of wages with respect to value …

Using data on the near-universe of US online job vacancies collected by Burning Glass
Technologies in 2016, we calculate labor market concentration using the Herfindahl …

We test whether wage growth slows following employer consolidation by examining hospital
mergers. We find evidence of reduced wage growth in cases where both (i) the increase in …

When jobs offered by different employers are not perfect substitutes, employers gain wage-
setting power; the extent of this power can be captured by the elasticity of labor supply to the …