In the last decade, numerous student assignment systems have been redesigned using
input from economists in the large American cities and elsewhere. This article reviews some …

The mechanism design approach to student assignment involves the theoretical, empirical,
and experimental study of systems used to allocate students into schools around the world …

Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …

A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate
school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. Many of …

Randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation. We generalize the theory
of randomized assignment to accommodate multi-unit allocations and various real-world …

We show that in the presence of admissions reserves, the effect of the precedence order (ie,
the order in which different types of seats are filled) is comparable to the effect of adjusting …

We conduct an experiment to study whether individuals save more when information about
the progress toward their self‐set savings goal is shared with another village member (a …

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We
survey the articles on discrete resource allocation problems, their solutions, and their …

It has been almost a half-century since David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962) published their
pathbreaking paper,“College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” in American …

Top trading cycles (TTC) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but
so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified …