This paper surveys the literature relevant for comparing centralized and decentralized
wholesale electricity markets. Under a centralized design, producers submit detailed cost …

This article provides a comprehensive survey of the literature on multiunit auctions with
multiple homogeneous goods. Despite the importance of multiunit auctions, the research on …

Wholesale electricity markets use different market designs to handle congestion in the
transmission network. We compare nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing in general …

The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in
oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of …

In a carbon auction, licenses for CO2 emissions are allocated among multiple interested
players. Inspired by this setting, we consider repeated multi-unit auctions with uniform …

In centralized day-ahead markets, producers submit detailed cost data to the market
operator that decides how much should be produced in each plant. This differs from …

We analyze how market design influences bidding in multiunit procurement auctions where
suppliers have asymmetric information about production costs. Our analysis is particularly …

Many electricity markets use capacity mechanisms to support producers. Capacity payments
can mitigate imperfections associated with “missing money” in the spot market and solve …

We model multi-unit auctions in which bidders' valuations are multidimensional private
information. Under a natural constraint on aggregate demand we show that the last …

We consider a multi-leader-common-follower model of a pay-as-bid electricity market in
which the producers provide the regulator with either linear or quadratic bids. We prove that …