Campaign promises as an imperfect signal: How does an extreme candidate win against a moderate candidate?
Y Asako - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2015 - journals.sagepub.com
This study develops a political competition model in which campaign platforms are partially
binding. A candidate who implements a policy that differs from his/her platform must pay a …
binding. A candidate who implements a policy that differs from his/her platform must pay a …
[PDF][PDF] The direction of strategic delegation and voter welfare in asymmetric tax competition models
Y Nishimura, K Terai - … School of Economics and Osaka School …, 2016 - econ.osaka-u.ac.jp
This paper examined a political process and economic consequences of tax competition
among asymmetric countries. Citizens are endowed with heterogeneous capital incomes …
among asymmetric countries. Citizens are endowed with heterogeneous capital incomes …
[图书][B] Analyzing electoral promises with game theory
Y Asako - 2020 - taylorfrancis.com
Electoral promises help to win votes and political candidates, or parties should strategically
choose what they can deliver to win an election. Past game-theoretical studies tend to …
choose what they can deliver to win an election. Past game-theoretical studies tend to …
Minor candidates as kingmakers
A Ishihara, S Miura - Public Choice, 2017 - Springer
We consider a sequential entry model with three candidates who cannot commit to any
policy announcement during the campaign. The study focuses on how a minor candidate …
policy announcement during the campaign. The study focuses on how a minor candidate …
Strategic candidacy for political compromise in party politics
A Ishihara - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2020 - journals.sagepub.com
We study political competition among parties with policy-motivated candidates and
demonstrate two-party competition where one of them has no chance of winning in the …
demonstrate two-party competition where one of them has no chance of winning in the …
[PDF][PDF] Yukihiro Nishimura
K Terai - 2021 - econ.osaka-u.ac.jp
This study examines the political process of tax competition among asymmetric countries,
highlighting the role of the commitment to the electoral promises. The median voters …
highlighting the role of the commitment to the electoral promises. The median voters …
[图书][B] Extreme events, ex post renegotiation and vagueness of campaign promises
E Manzoni - 2020 - dse.univr.it
The paper considers the effect of extreme ex-post realizations of the state of the world on
implemented policies. I model a unilateral renegotiation process through which the elected …
implemented policies. I model a unilateral renegotiation process through which the elected …
New Challenges for Civilization as a Determinants of the Transformation of Political Platforms-Some Theoretical Considerations
K Spryszak - … политических ландшафтов за период 1999-2019 …, 2019 - elibrary.ru
A political party platform or program is a formal set of principal goals which are supported by
a political party or individual candidate, in order to appeal to the general public, for the …
a political party or individual candidate, in order to appeal to the general public, for the …
[PDF][PDF] The Business Cycle and the Entry of Third-Party Candidates
Y Asako, T Matsubayashi - 2014 - waseda.jp
This study offers a new explanation for the entry of third-party and independent candidates
into the US state-level elections. We argue that the economic benefits of holding an office is …
into the US state-level elections. We argue that the economic benefits of holding an office is …
[PDF][PDF] KIER DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
A Ishihara, S Miura - kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp
This article studies a citizen-candidate model where the entry decision is sequential rather
than simultaneous. We focus on a situation where there exist three potential candidates …
than simultaneous. We focus on a situation where there exist three potential candidates …