We study the allocative challenges that governmental and nonprofit organizations face when
tasked with equitable and efficient rationing of a social good among agents whose needs …

This paper introduces a stylized model to capture distinctive features of waiting list allocation
mechanisms. First, agents choose among items with associated expected wait times …

Public housing benefits are rationed through wait lists. Theoretical work on public housing
allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying a …

We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services
catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and …

We study the problem of learning, from observational data, fair and interpretable policies that
effectively match heterogeneous individuals to scarce resources of different types. We model …

We study non-monetary markets where objects that arrive over time are allocated to unit-
demand agents with private types, such as in the allocation of public housing or deceased …

Allocating resources without monetary payments is expected to yield inefficient allocations.
Theory suggests that introducing rationing when resources are allocated repeatedly over …

I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two‐sided dynamic matching markets
where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time,(ii) matching is one‐to‐one, and (iii) …

We study the design of a decentralized two-sided matching market in which agents' search
is guided by the platform. Each agent is of one of finitely many types and has (potentially …

Two-sided platforms rely on their recommendation algorithms to help their visitors
successfully find a match. However, on platforms such as VolunteerMatch-which has …