We empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs, as measured by the
compensation gap between a CEO at one firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar …

We develop a general equilibrium model that delivers realistic fluctuations in pay inequality
as a result of changes in the technology frontier. In our model, executives add value to the …

I present and estimate a dynamic model of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and
effort provision. I find that variation in CEO attributes explains the majority of variation in …

Using a tractable structural model of the matching equilibrium between underwriters and
equity-issuing firms, we study the determinants of value in underwriter–firm relationships …

I develop a simple competitive equilibrium model and derive the prediction that CEO pay-
size elasticity increases when more firms compete for an inelastic supply of managers …

I estimate a dynamic agency model to quantify the importance of dismissals in CEO
incentives-vis-à-vis pecuniary compensation. The model features endogenous dynamics in …

I evaluate how firms' and CEOs' learning about their fit with one another affects CEO
turnover and compensation decisions. Building and estimating a dynamic model of the …

We answer recent research calls for theoretical work in two areas: adding frictions to
assignment models; and developing dynamic equilibrium models that permit study of issues …

We empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs, as measured by the
compensation gap between a CEO at one firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar …

This study examines the matching of CEOs to firms and the compensation earned by such
managers in a competitive labor market. I first develop a simple competitive equilibrium …