Leveraging lotteries for school value-added: Testing and estimation

JD Angrist, PD Hull, PA Pathak… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2017 - academic.oup.com
Conventional value-added models (VAMs) compare average test scores across schools
after regression-adjusting for students' demographic characteristics and previous scores …

School choice and equity: Current policies in OECD countries and a literature review

P Musset - 2012 - oecd-ilibrary.org
This report discusses the most relevant issues concerning school choice schemes, and how
they intertwine with equity considerations, through a literature review and analysis of the …

[图书][B] Algorithmics of matching under preferences

D Manlove - 2013 - books.google.com
Matching problems with preferences are all around us: they arise when agents seek to be
allocated to one another on the basis of ranked preferences over potential outcomes …

The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes

E Budish - Journal of Political Economy, 2011 - journals.uchicago.edu
This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …

Marketplaces, markets, and market design

AE Roth - American Economic Review, 2018 - aeaweb.org
Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …

Accountability and flexibility in public schools: Evidence from Boston's charters and pilots

A Abdulkadiroğlu, JD Angrist… - … Quarterly Journal of …, 2011 - academic.oup.com
We use student assignment lotteries to estimate the effect of charter school attendance on
student achievement in Boston. We also evaluate a related alternative, Boston's pilot …

Demand analysis using strategic reports: An application to a school choice mechanism

N Agarwal, P Somaini - Econometrica, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
Several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to
misrepresent their preferences. We find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in …

Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets

AE Roth - Journal of Economic perspectives, 2007 - aeaweb.org
This essay examines how repugnance sometimes constrains what transactions and markets
we see. When my colleagues and I have helped design markets and allocation procedures …

Research design meets market design: Using centralized assignment for impact evaluation

A Abdulkadiroğlu, JD Angrist, Y Narita… - Econometrica, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate
school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. Many of …

Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: A theoretical analysis

Y Chen, O Kesten - Journal of Political Economy, 2017 - journals.uchicago.edu
Each year approximately 10 million high school seniors in China compete for 6 million seats
through a centralized college admissions system. Within the last decade, many provinces …