We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …

Maximizing the revenue from selling more than one good (or item) to a single buyer is a
notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show …

We present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem
for multiple agents to single agent subproblems in the context of Bayesian combinatorial …

Abstract Systems wherein strategic agents compete for limited resources are ubiquitous: the
economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming …

We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in
multidimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary-possibly combinatorial-feasibility …

Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the
decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to …

Information structure design, also sometimes known as signaling or persuasion, is
concerned with understanding the effects of information on the outcomes of strategic …

Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for
selling one item to multiple bidders [18]. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at …

Using AI approaches to automatically design mechanisms has been a central research
mission at the interface of AI and economics [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002]. Previous …

This text provides a look at select topics in economic mechanism design through the lens of
approximation. It reviews the classical economic theory of mechanism design wherein a …