Abstract We study generalized Shapley-Scarf exchange markets where each agent is
endowed with multiple units of an indivisible and agent-specific good and monetary …

We consider multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995), which extend Shapley-Scarf
housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) from one dimension to higher dimensions. In …

This paper considers reallocation of indivisible objects when agents are endowed with and
can consume any bundles. We obtain characterizations of generalized versions of the Top …

For the random assignment problem, we introduce the notion of collusion-proofness that
happens if the rule is immune to any collusion on misreporting preferences as it is either not …

We investigate a market without money in which every agent offers indivisible goods in
multiple copies, in exchange for goods of other agents. The exchange must be balanced in …

We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model
(Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995) …

This paper considers exchange of indivisible objects when agents are endowed with and
desire bundles of objects. Agents are assumed to have lexicographic preferences over …

In portfolio compression, market participants (banks, organizations, companies, financial
agents) sign contracts, creating liabilities between each other, which increases the systemic …

Abstract For Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974), Fujinaka and
Wakayama (2018) propose a new incentive property, endowments-swapping-proofness …

Abstract For Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974), Fujinaka and
Wakayama (2018) consider an incentive property, endowments-swapping-proofness, that …