In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender has to design a signaling scheme that
discloses the right amount of information so as to influence the behavior of a self-interested …

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational
receivers that take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the …

We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to
influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver …

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information
to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent …

In the principal-agent problem formulated by Myerson [Mye82], agents have private
information (type) and make private decisions (action), both of which are unobservable to …

Bayesian persuasion studies the problem faced by an informed sender who strategically
discloses information to influence the behavior of an uninformed receiver. Recently, a …

We study the algorithmics of information structure design---aka persuasion or signaling---in
a fundamental special case introduced by Arieli and Babichenko: multiple agents, binary …

Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information
revelation---often described as a signaling scheme---in order to yield the most desirable …

Classic mechanism/information design imposes the assumption that agents are fully
rational, meaning each of them always selects the action that maximizes her expected utility …

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver
so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has …