A supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets

EM Azevedo, JD Leshno - Journal of Political Economy, 2016 - journals.uchicago.edu
This paper develops a price-theoretic framework for matching markets with heterogeneous
preferences. The model departs from the Gale and Shapley model by assuming that a finite …

Matching with (branch‐of‐choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy

T Sönmez, TB Switzer - Econometrica, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
Branch selection is a key decision in a cadet's military career. Cadets at USMA can increase
their branch priorities at a fraction of slots by extending their service agreement. This real …

Matching with slot‐specific priorities: Theory

SD Kominers, T Sönmez - Theoretical Economics, 2016 - Wiley Online Library
We introduce a two‐sided, many‐to‐one matching with contracts model in which agents with
unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts …

Matching with contracts: Comment

O Aygün, T Sönmez - American Economic Review, 2013 - aeaweb.org
The matching with contracts model (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) is widely considered to be
one of the most important advances of the last two decades in matching theory. One of their …

Understanding preferences:“demand types”, and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities

E Baldwin, P Klemperer - Econometrica, 2019 - Wiley Online Library
An Equivalence Theorem between geometric structures and utility functions allows new
methods for understanding preferences. Our classification of valuations into “Demand …

Bidding for army career specialties: Improving the ROTC branching mechanism

T Sönmez - Journal of Political Economy, 2013 - journals.uchicago.edu
Motivated by the low retention rates of US Military Academy and Reserve Officer Training
Corps graduates, the Army recently introduced incentives programs in which cadets could …

Discovering auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson

A Teytelboym, S Li, SD Kominers… - The Scandinavian …, 2021 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract The 2020 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel was awarded to Paul R. Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson for “improvements to auction …

Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis

F Kojima, A Tamura, M Yokoo - Journal of Economic Theory, 2018 - Elsevier
We consider two-sided matching problems where agents on one side of the market
(hospitals) are required to satisfy certain distributional constraints. We show that when the …

Recent developments in matching theory and their practical applications

F Kojima - Advances in Economics and Econometrics, 2017 - books.google.com
In recent years, many developments have been made in matching theory and its
applications to market design. This paper surveys them and suggests possible research …

Stability in large matching markets with complementarities

I Ashlagi, M Braverman, A Hassidim - Operations Research, 2014 - pubsonline.informs.org
Labor markets can often be viewed as many-to-one matching markets. It is well known that if
complementarities are present in such markets, a stable matching may not exist. We study …