I construct an informationally robust auction to sell a common‐value good. I examine the
revenue guarantee of an auction over all information structures of bidders and all equilibria …

We study the design of auctions when the auctioneer has limited statistical information about
the joint distribution of the bidders' valuations. More specifically, we consider an auctioneer …

A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be
interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures …

We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint
distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their …

Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various
information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer …

We analyze how uncertain technologies should be robustly regulated. An agent develops a
new technology and, while privately learning about its harms and benefits, continually …

This paper characterizes the efficient market demands among those with a fixed surplus
level in a multi-product monopoly, where the monopolist is able to produce a continuum of …

We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint
distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their …

An algorithm recommends a product to a buyer based on the product's value to the buyer
and its price. We characterize an algorithm that maximizes the buyer's expected payoff and …

This paper examines the welfare implications of third-party informational intermediation. A
seller sets the price of a product that is sold through an informational intermediary. The …