Scoring strategic agents

I Ball - arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.01888, 2019 - arxiv.org
I introduce a model of predictive scoring. A receiver wants to predict a sender's quality. An
intermediary observes multiple features of the sender and aggregates them into a score …

Censorship as optimal persuasion

A Kolotilin, T Mylovanov… - Theoretical …, 2022 - Wiley Online Library
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the
expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and …

Understanding the nexus between environmental, social, and governance (ESG) and financial performance: Evidence from Chinese-listed companies

R Zhou, J Hou, F Ding - Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 2023 - Springer
Before discussing how to balance and decide on environmental, social, and corporate
governance (ESG) and traditional revenue enhancement projects, it is crucial to clarify the …

Modelo teórico de gestión de la calidad del servicio para promover la competitividad de los restaurantes de cocina tradicional de la costa ecuatoriana

E Silva Gómez, GL Luján Johnson - Siembra, 2022 - scielo.senescyt.gob.ec
El objetivo de este artículo es formular un modelo de calidad de servicio que permita el
fomento de la competitividad de restaurantes de cocina tradicional ecuatoriana de la ciudad …

Bayesian persuasion and moral hazard

R Boleslavsky, K Kim - Available at SSRN 2913669, 2018 - papers.ssrn.com
We consider a three-player Bayesian persuasion game in which the sender designs a signal
about an unknown state of the world, the agent exerts a private effort that determines the …

[图书][B] Quality disclosure and regulation: Scoring design in medicare advantage

B Vatter - 2023 - aeaweb.org
Policymakers and market intermediaries often use quality scores to alleviate asymmetric
information about product quality. Scores affect the demand for quality and, in equilibrium, its …

How to sell hard information

SN Ali, N Haghpanah, X Lin… - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2022 - academic.oup.com
The seller of an asset has the option to buy hard information about the value of the asset
from an intermediary. The seller can then disclose this information before selling the asset in …

Did product certification and e-commerce benefit agricultural producers in China?

S Liu, Y Jin, F Zheng - Food Policy, 2024 - Elsevier
This study investigates the impacts of product certification and e-commerce on various
production and profitability outcomes for grain and cash crop producers in China, using …

Quality certification decision of online retail platform under heterogeneous manufacturers

Q Zhang, J Chen, J Zhao, DQ Yao - Transportation Research Part E …, 2025 - Elsevier
As a major instrument of quality assurance implemented in online business, quality
certifications play pivotal roles in retailing platforms' operations. This paper studies whether …

Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues: Introduction to the Special Issue on Communication and Persuasion

E Kamenica, K Kim, A Zapechelnyuk - Economic Theory, 2021 - JSTOR
Bayesian persuasion, or information design, 1 is one of the most prolific fields of economic
theory in the recent years. 2 Celebrating the decade of its success, and projecting another …