ABSTRACT New York City is the hot spot of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States.
This paper merges information on the number of tests and the number of infections at the …

A concern central to the economics of privacy is that firms may use consumer data to price
discriminate. A common response is that consumers should have control over their data and …

An information designer has precise information about consumers' preferences over
products sold by oligopolists. The designer chooses what information to reveal to …

Abstract Machine learning algorithms are increasingly able to predict what goods and
services particular people will buy, and at what price. It is possible to imagine a situation in …

Are competing firms better off with more targeting? We examine this question in the context
of targeting advertising spending and price in the Hotelling model. By “more targeting,” we …

We analyze the effects of different data selling mechanisms of a monopolistic Data Broker
(DB) who sells consumer data to firms in a downstream market with free entry, where data …

We study how a data-rich firm can benefit by unilaterally sharing its customer data with a
data-poor competitor when the data can be used for price discrimination. By sharing data on …

We study a two-period model of behavior-based price discrimination where firms can agree
to share customer information before the first-period competition begins, and the information …

A seller faces a consumer with an uncertain value for the product. The seller has imperfect
private information about the value and requests additional data to set the price. The …

We study endogenous personalized pricing in Hotelling's model with vertically differentiated
products, cost asymmetries and linear adjustment costs. We characterize the equilibrium …