Are boards designed to fail? The implausibility of effective board monitoring

S Boivie, MK Bednar, RV Aguilera… - … of Management Annals, 2016 - journals.aom.org
In this review, we challenge the idea that directors are well positioned to be effective
monitors of management. Moving beyond the logic of incentives and ability, we …

Corporate governance in the hospitality and tourism industry: theoretical foundations and future research

Y Li, M Singal - Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research, 2022 - journals.sagepub.com
Although the importance of effective corporate governance for firm performance is
recognized by scholars across hospitality and tourism (HT) as well as finance and general …

[引用][C] Strategic leadership: Theory and research on executives, top management teams, and boards

S Finkelstein - 2009 - books.google.com
This book integrates and assesses the vast and rapidly growing literature on strategic
leadership, which is the study of top executives and their effects on organizations. The basic …

Maintaining legitimacy: Controversies, orders of worth, and public justifications

G Patriotta, JP Gond, F Schultz - Journal of Management …, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
abstract We build on Boltanski and Thévenot's theory of justification to account for the ways
in which different stakeholder groups actively engage with discourses and objects to …

[图书][B] International marketing and export management

GS Albaum, G Albaum, E Duerr - 2008 - books.google.com
This book is suitable for Undergraduates and Postgraduates/MBA courses in International
Marketing, Export Marketing and International Trade. This book comprehensively covers …

Has agency theory run its course?: Making the theory more flexible to inform the management of reward systems

G Cuevas‐Rodríguez, LR Gomez‐Mejia… - Corporate …, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Manuscript Type Conceptual Research Question/Issue In this paper we discuss
three assumptions of agency theory:(1) conflicts of interest between principal and agent,(2) …

Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs?

A Morse, V Nanda, A Seru - The Journal of Finance, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
We argue that some powerful CEOs induce boards to shift the weight on performance
measures toward the better performing measures, thereby rigging incentive pay. A simple …

Board independence and firm performance: The moderating effect of institutional context

MV Uribe-Bohorquez, J Martínez-Ferrero… - Journal of business …, 2018 - Elsevier
This study proposes a new research approach to examine the relationship between board
independence and corporate performance, measured by technical efficiency. Moreover, this …

Context, behavior, and evolution: Challenges in research on boards and governance

J Gabrielsson, M Huse - International Studies of Management & …, 2004 - Taylor & Francis
In this article, we present an overview of empirical research on boards and governance in
leading US and international academic journals in general management. Samples …

The behavioral theory of the (governed) firm: Corporate board influences on organizations' responses to performance shortfalls

VM Desai - Academy of Management Journal, 2016 - journals.aom.org
Please see the Notice of Retraction. The Behavioral Theory of the Firm provides a well-
evidenced perspective on organizational decision making that has influenced a wide array …