Imperfect information and aggregate supply

NG Mankiw, R Reis - Handbook of monetary economics, 2010 - Elsevier
This paper surveys the research in the past decade on imperfect information models of
aggregate supply and the Phillips curve. This new work has emphasized that information is …

Sentiments

GM Angeletos, J La'o - Econometrica, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
This paper develops a new theory of fluctuations—one that helps accommodate the notions
of “animal spirits” and “market sentiment” in unique‐equilibrium, rational‐expectations …

Strategic interaction and networks

Y Bramoullé, R Kranton, M D'amours - American Economic Review, 2014 - aeaweb.org
Geography and social links shape economic interactions. In industries, schools, and
markets, the entire network determines outcomes. This paper analyzes a large class of …

Incomplete information in macroeconomics: Accommodating frictions in coordination

GM Angeletos, C Lian - Handbook of macroeconomics, 2016 - Elsevier
This chapter studies how incomplete information helps accommodate frictions in
coordination, leading to novel insights on the joint determination of expectations and …

Knowing what others know: Coordination motives in information acquisition

C Hellwig, L Veldkamp - The Review of Economic Studies, 2009 - academic.oup.com
We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models.
When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information …

Information design

I Taneva - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019 - aeaweb.org
A designer commits to a signal distribution that is informative about a payoff-relevant state.
Conditional upon the privately observed signals, agents take actions that affect their payoffs …

Strategic supply function competition with private information

X Vives - Econometrica, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The cost of
each seller is random, with common and private value components, and the seller receives …

Robust predictions in games with incomplete information

D Bergemann, S Morris - Econometrica, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions that are valid
for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may …

Expectations with endogenous information acquisition: An experimental investigation

A Fuster, R Perez-Truglia, M Wiederholt… - Review of Economics …, 2022 - direct.mit.edu
We use a survey experiment to generate direct evidence on how people acquire and
process information. Participants can buy different information signals that could help them …

Endogenous information acquisition in coordination games

DP Myatt, C Wallace - The Review of Economic Studies, 2012 - academic.oup.com
In the context of a “beauty-contest” coordination game (in which pay-offs depend on the
quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and from the average …