The Price of Stability for First Price Auction

[PDF] arxiv.org

Complexity of equilibria in first-price auctions under general tie-breaking rules

X Chen, B Peng - Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on …, 2023 - dl.acm.org
We study the complexity of finding an approximate (pure) Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a
first-price auction with common priors when the tie-breaking rule is part of the input. We …
被引用次数：11 相关文章 所有 6 个版本
[PDF] arxiv.org

First Price Auction is 1-1/e2 Efficient

Y Jin, P Lu - Journal of the ACM, 2023 - dl.acm.org
First Price Auction is 1-1/e2 Efficient | Journal of the ACM skip to main content ACM Digital
Library home ACM home Google, Inc. (search) Advanced Search Browse About Sign in …
被引用次数：16 相关文章 所有 5 个版本

Benchmark-Tight Approximation Ratio of Simple Mechanism for a Unit-Demand Buyer

Y Jin, P Lu - 2024 IEEE 65th Annual Symposium on …, 2024 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We study revenue maximization in the unit-demand single-buyer setting. Our main result is
that Uniform-Ironed-Virtual-Value Item Pricing guarantees a tight 3-approximation to the …
相关文章 所有 2 个版本
[PDF] sigecom.org

Settling the efficiency of the first-price auction

Y Jin, P Lu - ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2024 - dl.acm.org
Settling the Efficiency of the First-Price Auction Page 1 Settling the Efficiency of the First-Price
Auction YAONAN JIN Columbia University and PINYAN LU Shanghai University of Finance …
被引用次数：2 相关文章 所有 3 个版本

[图书][B] Bayesian Auction Design and Approximation

Y Jin - 2023 - search.proquest.com
Bayesian Auction Design and Approximation Yaonan Jin Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doct Page 1 Bayesian Auction Design and Approximation …
相关文章 所有 2 个版本