Bank leverage and monetary policy's risk‐taking channel: evidence from the United States
We present evidence of a risk‐taking channel of monetary policy for the US banking system.
We use confidential data on banks' internal ratings on loans to businesses over the period …
We use confidential data on banks' internal ratings on loans to businesses over the period …
Real interest rates, leverage, and bank risk-taking
Do low interest rate environments lead to greater bank risk-taking? We show that, when
banks can adjust their capital structures, reductions in real interest rates lead to greater …
banks can adjust their capital structures, reductions in real interest rates lead to greater …
Accounting discretion, loan loss provisioning, and discipline of banks' risk-taking
RM Bushman, CD Williams - Journal of accounting and economics, 2012 - Elsevier
Examining banks across 27 countries, we estimate two measures of the forward-looking
orientation reflected in discretionary loan provisioning practices within a country. We …
orientation reflected in discretionary loan provisioning practices within a country. We …
Hazardous times for monetary policy: What do twenty‐three million bank loans say about the effects of monetary policy on credit risk‐taking?
We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk‐taking with an exhaustive credit
register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of …
register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of …
Safer ratios, riskier portfolios: Banks׳ response to government aid
Using novel data on bank applications to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), we
study the effect of government assistance on bank risk taking. Bailed-out banks initiate …
study the effect of government assistance on bank risk taking. Bailed-out banks initiate …
Failure and rescue in an interbank network
LCG Rogers, LAM Veraart - Management Science, 2013 - pubsonline.informs.org
This paper is concerned with systemic risk in an interbank market, modelled as a directed
graph of interbank obligations. This builds on the modelling paradigm of Eisenberg and Noe …
graph of interbank obligations. This builds on the modelling paradigm of Eisenberg and Noe …
Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking
This paper examines empirically the hypothesis that market discipline is effective in
providing incentives for banks to limit their risk of default, by holding capital buffers against …
providing incentives for banks to limit their risk of default, by holding capital buffers against …
Too many to fail—An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies
VV Acharya, T Yorulmazer - Journal of financial intermediation, 2007 - Elsevier
While the too-big-to-fail guarantee is explicitly a part of bank regulation in many countries,
this paper shows that bank closure policies also suffer from an implicit “too-many-to-fail” …
this paper shows that bank closure policies also suffer from an implicit “too-many-to-fail” …
Bank bailouts and moral hazard: Evidence from Germany
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the
banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout …
banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout …
The impact of public guarantees on bank risk-taking: Evidence from a natural experiment
R Gropp, C Gruendl, A Guettler - Review of Finance, 2014 - academic.oup.com
In 2001, government guarantees for savings banks in Germany were removed following a
lawsuit. We use this natural experiment to examine the effect of government guarantees on …
lawsuit. We use this natural experiment to examine the effect of government guarantees on …