We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas.
Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching …

Over 100,000 refugees are permanently resettled from refugee camps to hosting countries
every year. Nevertheless, refugee resettlement processes in most countries are ad hoc …

While much of the school choice literature advocates strategyproofness, recent research has
aimed to improve efficiency using mechanisms that rely on non-truthtelling equilibria. We …

Efficiency and symmetric treatment of agents are the primary goals of resource allocation in
environments without transfers. Focusing on ordinal mecha-nisms in which no small group …

Diversity Constraints in Public Housing Allocation Page 1 HAL Id: hal-01943975 https://hal.sorbonne-universite.fr/hal-01943975
Submitted on 4 Dec 2018 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit …

We show that the provision of social information influences a high-stakes decision and this
influence persists over time. In a field experiment involving thousands of admits to Teach For …

We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for
studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a …

In assignment problems, the rank distribution of assigned objects is often used to evaluate
match quality. Rank-minimizing (RM) mechanisms directly optimize for average rank. While …

Collective decision making requires preference aggregation even if no ideal aggregation
method exists (Arrow, 1950). We investigate how individuals think groups should aggregate …

The one-sided matching problem is concerned with the allocation of indivisible goods to self-
interested agents with privately known preferences. Monetary transfers are not permitted …