This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non‐cooperative, fully
decentralized, and in Markov strategies. Workers and firms bargain with each other to …

We extend a simple repeated, multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda
setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other …

In this chapter, I will focus on the complete information non-cooperative literature on
commitment in this millennium. I define pre-commitment as an explicit choice to restrict one's …

This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully
decentralized, and in Markov strategies. Workers and firms bargain with each other to …

We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary
the information available to participants, complete or incomplete, and the surplus structure …

Different sellers often sell the same good at different prices. Using a strategic bargaining
model, I characterize how the equilibrium prices of a good depend on the interaction …

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics Page 1 Cambridge-INET Working Paper Series No:
2020/29 Cambridge Working Papers in Economics: 2063 LARGE SCALE EXPERIMENTS ON …

In a variety of settings, budgets are set by a committee that interacts repeatedly over many
budget cycles. To capture this, we study a model of repeated multilateral bargaining by a …

We design a laboratory experiment to investigate matching in a decentralized market of
deferred acceptance. Agents are undifferentiated and may have multiple partners; their …

We experimentally examine the Becker-Shapley-Shubik two-sided matching model. In the
experiment, the aggregate outcomes of matching and surplus are affected by whether equal …