Subsidization of public transit service under double moral hazard
X Wen, X Chen, Z Yang - Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its …, 2023 - Elsevier
This paper aims to explore incentive issues and characteristics of optimal contract schemes
for subsidizing public transit services under double moral hazard, which refers to situations …
for subsidizing public transit services under double moral hazard, which refers to situations …
Why does sharecropping survive? Agrarian institutions and contract choice in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
N Mukhamedova, R Pomfret - Comparative economic studies, 2019 - Springer
A century ago, Alfred Marshall demonstrated the inefficiency associated with farmers
receiving only a portion of their marginal product. Farmers will supply less labor than under …
receiving only a portion of their marginal product. Farmers will supply less labor than under …
[HTML][HTML] Pharmaceutical innovation collaboration, evaluation, and matching
Q Liu - Journal of Health Economics, 2024 - Elsevier
This paper theoretically studies pharmaceutical innovation collaborations, where
heterogeneous firms compete for heterogeneous academics. At an interim stage, the firm …
heterogeneous firms compete for heterogeneous academics. At an interim stage, the firm …
16. Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions
I Macho-Stadler, D Pérez-Castrillo - Handbook of Game Theory …, 2018 - books.google.com
Moral hazard (also called hidden action), the informational asymmetry related to the agent's
behavior during a relationship, has been a long-time concern for insurance. It is said that the …
behavior during a relationship, has been a long-time concern for insurance. It is said that the …
Agency theory meets matching theory
I Macho-Stadler, D Pérez-Castrillo - SERIEs, 2021 - Springer
The theory of incentives and matching theory can complement each other. In particular,
matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general …
matching theory can be a tool for analyzing optimal incentive contracts within a general …
Is informal risk-sharing less effective for the poor? Risk externalities and moral hazard in mutual insurance
M Delpierre, B Verheyden, S Weynants - Journal of Development …, 2016 - Elsevier
Poor farm-households are less keen to adopt high risk/high return technologies than rich
households. Yet, the poor are more vulnerable to income shocks. We develop a model of …
households. Yet, the poor are more vulnerable to income shocks. We develop a model of …
Matching to share risk without commitment
J Gierlinger, S Laczó - The Economic Journal, 2018 - academic.oup.com
This article studies the effect of limited commitment on sorting when two sides of a
frictionless market form pairs to share risk. On each side, agents are identical except for their …
frictionless market form pairs to share risk. On each side, agents are identical except for their …
Optimal tenurial contracts under both moral hazard and adverse selection
C At, L Thomas - American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2019 - Wiley Online Library
This paper determines the optimal tenurial contract between a monopoly landlord and a
tenant protected by limited liability under both adverse selection (based on the tenant's …
tenant protected by limited liability under both adverse selection (based on the tenant's …
Dynamic contract design in the presence of double moral hazard
We consider a stylized incentive management problem over an infinite time horizon, where
the principal hires an agent to provide services to customers. Customers request service in …
the principal hires an agent to provide services to customers. Customers request service in …
Compensation, moral hazard, and talent misallocation in the market for CEOS
L Chen - Available at SSRN 2670083, 2017 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper develops an estimable model to quantify the efficiency loss arising from both risk
sharing and talent misallocation due to the presence of moral hazard in the market for CEOs …
sharing and talent misallocation due to the presence of moral hazard in the market for CEOs …