The limited success of the UNFCCC negotiations has enticed scholars, environmentalists,
and policymakers alike to propose alternative approaches to climate cooperation. This …

This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative game …

In recent years, the number of publications that analyze the formation and stability of
international environmental agreements (IEAs) using the method of game theory has sharply …

This paper generalizes the benchmark model of self-enforcing international environmental
agreements (IEAs) by allowing for all possible coalitions of n asymmetric nations …

This paper considers whether international environmental public goods provision, such as
mitigation of climate change, is better dealt with through regional cooperation than through a …

This intermediate-level undergraduate textbook in environmental economics builds on the
microeconomics courses students take in their first year. It intentionally does not survey the …

This paper analyses the formation and stability of coalitions to form international
environmental agreements. We present and apply the Stability of coalitions model to assess …

In this chapter both theory and empirics are used to show that our picture of the processes of
economic development changes radically when nature is introduced as a capital asset …

Most noncooperative game theoretic models of international environmental agreements
(IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation. In this paper …

We review formal (and some more informal) models of climate cooperation derived from
economics and political science. These models convey two main messages. On one hand …