In hedonic games, a set of n agents, having preferences over all possible coalition
structures, needs to agree on a stable outcome. In this work, we initiate the study of hedonic …

Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into
disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous work …

The core is a well-known and fundamental notion of stability in games intended to model
coalition formation such as hedonic games. The fact that the number of deviating agents …

We revisit the complexity of the well-studied notion of Additively Separable Hedonic Games
(ASHGs). Such games model a basic clustering or coalition formation scenario in which …

We consider the online version of the coalition structure generation problem, in which
agents, corresponding to the vertices of a graph, appear in an online fashion and have to be …

Coalition formation considers the question of how to partition a set of $ n $ agents into
disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. We consider a cardinal utility model with …

We investigate strategyproof mechanisms for Friends and Enemies Games, a subclass of
Hedonic Games in which every agent classifies any other one as a friend or as an enemy. In …

Hedonic games model cooperative games where agents desire to form coalitions, and only
care about the composition of the coalitions of which they are members. Focusing on various …

We investigate strategyproof mechanisms in the Group Activity Selection Problem with the
additively separable property. Namely, agents have distinct preferences for each activity and …

Additively Separable Hedonic Game (ASHG) are coalition-formation games where we are
given a graph whose vertices represent $ n $ selfish agents and the weight of each edge …