A sender seeks hard evidence to persuade a receiver to take a certain action. There is
uncertainty about whether the sender obtains evidence. If she does, she can choose to …

This paper examines an adverse selection environment where a sender with private
information (high or low ability) tries to convince a receiver of their high ability. Without …

A sender flexibly acquires evidence--which she may pay a third party to certify--to disclose to
a receiver. When evidence acquisition is overt, the receiver observes the evidence gathering …

This paper studies certification design and its implications for information disclosure. Our
model features a profit‐maximizing certifier and the seller of a good of unknown quality. We …

We cast mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982), whereby his
generalized revelation principle directly applies and yields standard notions of incentive …

We consider the disclosure problem of a sender who wants to use hard evidence to
persuade a receiver towards higher actions. When the receiver hopes to make inferences …

This thesis contains 3 chapters, each of which explores the implications of partial disclosure
in a different context. As disclosures affect the beliefs of key actors in each scenario, optimal …

An underlying assumption in many principal agent models and its applications is that the
agent has some private information and principal has the bargaining power of setting …