Auctions with contingent payments—an overview
A Skrzypacz - International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2013 - Elsevier
I survey a literature on auctions with contingent payments, that is auctions in which
payments are allowed to depend on an ex-post verifiable variable, such as revenues in oil …
payments are allowed to depend on an ex-post verifiable variable, such as revenues in oil …
The timing and method of payment in mergers when acquirers are financially constrained
AS Gorbenko, A Malenko - The Review of Financial Studies, 2018 - academic.oup.com
Although acquisitions are a popular form of investment, the link between firms' financial
constraints and acquisition policies is not well understood. We develop a model in which …
constraints and acquisition policies is not well understood. We develop a model in which …
[HTML][HTML] Security auctions with cash-and equity-bids: An experimental study
We study the performance of cash-and equity-bid security auctions in an experiment using
first-and second-price pricing rules. Theory predicts revenue equivalence between first-and …
first-and second-price pricing rules. Theory predicts revenue equivalence between first-and …
Asymmetric information and security design under Knightian uncertainty
A privately informed issuer raises project financing from an uninformed investor through a
security sale. The investor faces Knightian uncertainty and evaluates each security by the …
security sale. The investor faces Knightian uncertainty and evaluates each security by the …
Efficient entry in competing auctions
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions
in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing …
in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing …
Endogenous entry to security-bid auctions
T Sogo, D Bernhardt, T Liu - American Economic Review, 2016 - aeaweb.org
We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly and bidders
must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first consider any …
must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first consider any …
Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders
T Liu - Journal of Economic Theory, 2016 - Elsevier
I analyze the effects of heterogeneity in terms of bidders' valuation distributions and
standalone values in equity auctions—auctions in which bidders offer equities rather than …
standalone values in equity auctions—auctions in which bidders offer equities rather than …
Financing bidders in takeover contests
V Vladimirov - Journal of Financial Economics, 2015 - Elsevier
This paper argues that endogenizing how acquirers finance their cash bids is just as
important for understanding bidding in takeovers as endogenizing acquirers׳ payment …
important for understanding bidding in takeovers as endogenizing acquirers׳ payment …
Rent extraction with securities plus cash
T Liu, D Bernhardt - The Journal of Finance, 2021 - Wiley Online Library
In our target‐initiated theory of takeovers, a target approaches potential acquirers that
privately know their standalone values and merger synergies, where higher synergy …
privately know their standalone values and merger synergies, where higher synergy …
Social influence, competition, and free riding: Examining seller interactions within an online social network
Online social networks are increasingly being used to conduct commercial activities, and
many online social networking platforms allow users to sell products to their online …
many online social networking platforms allow users to sell products to their online …