I study a dynamic model in which a decision‐maker (DM) acquires information about the
payoffs of different alternatives prior to making a decision. The model's key feature is the …

How can a receiver design an information structure in order to elicit information from a
sender? We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by …

We provide a unified analysis of how dynamic information should be designed in optimal
stopping problems: a principal controls the flow of information about a payoff relevant state …

In many economic situations, a sender communicates strategically with a receiver not only to
influence the latter's decision-making but also to influence how certain unobserved …

We fully characterize the possible outcomes of exploration and stopping: all statetime joint
distributions achieved by stopping some martingale process with bounded variation …

We study reputation for toughness in finitely repeated contests for a fixed prize in each
period. Players are rational (payoff% maximizing), or VtoughV (always exerting an …

In many economic situations, people communicate strategically not only to influence the
decision-making of their audience but also to shape the perception of certain unobserved …

I consider the sequential implementation of a target information structure. I characterize the
set of decision time distributions induced by all signal processes that satisfy a per-period …

The dissertation consists of three essays, focusing on information and data. The booming
digital technology and data economy allow wide collection, disclosure, and trade of …

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