This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As
in the previous additions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include …

We study a citizen‐candidate‐entry model with private information about ideal points. We
fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only …

Voters in elections under plurality rule face relatively straightforward incentives. In
proportional representation systems, voters face more complex incentives as electoral …

We construct models of the endogenous formation of politicalgroups designed to capture
some of the key features ofpolitical and social conflict. We draw on thecitizencandidate' …

We provide a set of new models of three different processes by which political parties
nominate candidates for a general election: nominations by party leaders, nominations by a …

How does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system (ie the
number and the policy platforms of the competing parties)? By studying a model where both …

We analyse a model of coalition government in a parliamentary democracy where parties
care both for ideology and perks from office, and examine how the magnitude of this tradeoff …

We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on a citizen–candidate model with
private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all …

Traditionally, research on political campaigns has focused on the positioning of parties and
not on how parties communicate with the electorate. We construct a model where two parties …

We investigate whether letting people vote for multiple candidates would yield policy
moderation. We do so in a setting that takes three key features of elections into account …