This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public
universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be …

We consider house (re) allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict
preferences. We are concerned with the possibility that a pair of agents may gain by …

In some well-known hospital–intern type of matching markets, hospitals impose mandatory
application fees on internship applicants to consider their applications. Motivated by this real …

We identify a new channel through which schools can potentially manipulate the well-known
student and school-optimal stable mechanisms. We introduce two fictitious students creation …

Stability is a main concern in the school choice problem. However, it does not come for free.
The literature shows that stability is incompatible with Pareto efficiency. Nevertheless, it has …

We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a
centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known …

The design of college admissions has been a heatedly discussed topic in Finland, as recent
government initiatives have led to a more centralized system. Some argue for letting …

We consider house allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences.
We introduce a new axiom called pre-exchange-proofness, which states that no pair of …