How do electoral incentives affect legislator behavior? Evidence from US state legislatures

A Fouirnaies, AB Hall - American Political Science Review, 2022 - cambridge.org
A classic question about democratic elections is how much they are able to influence
politician behavior by forcing them to anticipate future reelection attempts, especially in …

On the informativeness of descriptive statistics for structural estimates

I Andrews, M Gentzkow, JM Shapiro - Econometrica, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
We propose a way to formalize the relationship between descriptive analysis and structural
estimation. A researcher reports an estimate ĉ of a structural quantity of interest c that is …

Expressive vs. strategic voters: An empirical assessment

JL Spenkuch - Journal of Public Economics, 2018 - Elsevier
Leading theories of how voters choose between candidates are rooted in two very different
paradigms, with starkly different behavioral implications. Exploiting the incentive structure of …

Localism, Pretext, and the Color of School Dollars

DW Black - Minn. L. Rev., 2022 - HeinOnline
Localism, Pretext, and the Color of School Dollars Page 1 Article Localism, Pretext, and the
Color of School Dollars Derek W. Blackt Introduction …

Complexity and choice

Y Salant, JL Spenkuch - 2021 - papers.ssrn.com
We study two dimensions of complexity that may interfere with individual choice. The first
one is object complexity, which corresponds to the difficulty in evaluating any given …

Career concerns and the dynamics of electoral accountability

M Iaryczower, G Lopez‐Moctezuma… - American Journal of …, 2024 - Wiley Online Library
Quantifying the value that legislators give to reelection relative to policy is crucial to
understanding electoral accountability. We estimate the preferences for office and policy of …

Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network

R Ferrali - Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 - Elsevier
How does the structure of an organization affect corruption? This paper analyzes a model
that views organizations as networks on which coalitions of corrupt accomplices may form …

Sequential vote buying

Y Chen, J Zapal - Journal of Economic Theory, 2022 - Elsevier
To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from q committee members with heterogeneous
opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers …

Politics from the bench? Ideology and strategic voting in the US Supreme Court

TS Clark, BP Montagnes, JL Spenkuch - Journal of Public Economics, 2022 - Elsevier
Abstract In the United States, Supreme Court justices often vote along ideological lines. Why
this is the case remains incompletely understood. To learn more about justices' preferences …

The difficulty of easy projects

W Dziuda, AA Gitmez, M Shadmehr - American Economic Review …, 2021 - aeaweb.org
We consider binary private contributions to public good projects that succeed when the
number of contributors exceeds a threshold. We show that for standard distributions of …