But who will monitor the monitor?

D Rahman - American Economic Review, 2012 - aeaweb.org
Suppose that providing incentives for a group of individuals in a strategic context requires a
monitor to detect their deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? To address this …

Public participation in budgeting: The new path of budget reform in Thailand

T Lorsuwannarat - International Journal of Public Administration, 2017 - Taylor & Francis
The purposes of this article are three fold. First is to explore the status of public participation
budgeting in central, regional, and local administrative levels of Thailand. Second is to …

Mediated contracts and mechanism design

R Strausz - Journal of Economic Theory, 2012 - Elsevier
The framework of incentive compatible finite direct coordination mechanisms in the sense of
Myerson (1982)[5] is isomorphic to a framework of incentive compatible stochastic mediated …

[PDF][PDF] Secret contracts for efficient partnerships

D Rahman, I Obara - University of Minnesota, Department of …, 2008 - economics.uci.edu
By allocating different information to team members, secret contracts can provide better
incentives to perform with an intuitive organizational design. For instance, they may help to …

[PDF][PDF] YApproximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance

I Obara, D Rahman - 2006 - old.gtcenter.org
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance Page 1 Approximate
Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance Ichiro Obara ∗ and David Rahman † April 10 …

[PDF][PDF] Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships

I Obara, D Rahman - 2006 - igier.unibocconi.eu
By allocating different information to team members, secret contracts can provide better
incentives to perform with an intuitive organizational design. For instance, they may help to …

[引用][C] Optimum Contracts and Efficient Partnerships with Private Monitoring

[引用][C] Ökonomische Aspekte der Profession Fußballschiedsrichter

D Verst - 2006 - GRIN Verlag