This paper provides an elementary, non‐technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing
and describing some of the critical papers in the subject.(The most important of these are …

February 2000 was a stressful month for me: the UK 3G auction was about to begin. For over
two years I had been working with the UK government to design the world's first auction of …

A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are
privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the …

We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically
informed risk neutral and risk averse bidders when there is random noncompetitive demand …

Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single
buyer. We show that, unlike the case of one good, when the buyer's values for the goods …

This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where
the agents' effort in each stage gives rise to a stochastic performance signal privately …

Abstract The 2020 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel was awarded to Paul R. Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson for “improvements to auction …

Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings.
In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a …

Online labor markets are Web-based platforms that enable buyers to identify and contract for
information technology (IT) services with service providers using buyer-determined (BD) …

A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information
regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This …