We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure
policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping …

This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model in which the buyer's valuation for the object is
uncertain and she can privately purchase any signal about her valuation. The seller makes a …

Information design in multistage games - Makris - 2023 - Theoretical Economics - Wiley Online
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We study robustly-optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes
revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distributions …

An asset owner designs an asset-backed security and a signal about its value. After privately
observing the signal, he sells the security to the monopolistic liquidity supplier. Any optimal …

A seller offers a buyer a schedule of transfers and associated product qualities, as in Mussa
and Rosen (1978). After observing this schedule, the buyer chooses a flexible costly signal …

In models of certification, possible restrictions on the nature of the fee structures are
commonly analyzed. We show that they are irrelevant for the certifier's ability to maximize …

In many games of interest (eg, trade, entry, leadership, warfare, and partnership
environments), one player (the leader) covertly acquires information about the state of …

We apply information design approach to studying market segmentation and third-degree
price discrimination in a duopoly market with captive and contested consumers. A market …

Producers of heterogeneous goods with heterogeneous costs compete in prices. When
producers know their own production costs and the consumer knows their values, consumer …