We consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show
that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore …

We construct a variant of the Vickrey auction of a single object where the surplus is split in
exogenously fixed shares between the seller and the buyers, up to a margin of error …

It is well known that any decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free mechanism for
allocating a single object with transfers is vulnerable to manipulation. In this paper we …

We consider the problem of allocating a single indivisible good among nn agents when
monetary transfers are allowed. We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof …

We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single indivisible good among
agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We construct a new strategy-proof rule, called …

In the standard auction model, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the value
domain under which non-trivial mechanisms exist that satisfy group strategy-proofness and …

We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers
are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to …

A second price Vickrey auction is a simple mechanism to transfer a valuable object (a good)
between a seller and n potential buyers. It treats buyers fairly, elicits their truthful valuations …

Collusion is a serious concern in real-life allocation problems. Auctions, for example, often
create incentives for the bidders to compete less fiercely so as to increase their profits. This …

This thesis consists of three essays in mechanism design theory. In Chapter 2, we study the
design of incentive-compatible award mechanisms called impartial nomination rules. A …