Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …

The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic
versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms …

Living donor kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment for patients suffering from end‐
stage renal disease. To alleviate the shortage of kidney donors, many advances have been …

The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a classical problem in economics and
computer science. In kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney …

Most algorithmic matches in fielded kidney exchanges do not result in an actual transplant.
In this paper, we address the problem of cycles and chains in a proposed match failing after …

The allocation and exchange of discrete resources, such as transplant organs, public
housing, dormitory rooms, and many other resources for which agents have single‐unit …

A kidney exchange is an organized barter market where patients in need of a kidney swap
willing but incompatible donors. Determining an optimal set of exchanges is theoretically …

We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from market failures whose remedy could
increase transplants by 30 to 63 percent. First, we document that the market is fragmented …

Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly
matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient …

Kidney exchange, where needy patients swap incompatible donors with each other, offers a
lifesaving alternative to waiting for an organ from the deceased-donor waiting list. Recently …