I incorporate computational constraints into decision theory in order to capture how cognitive
limitations affect behavior. I impose an axiom of computational tractability that only rules out …

Classic mechanism/information design imposes the assumption that agents are fully
rational, meaning each of them always selects the action that maximizes her expected utility …

This paper considers the design of non-truthful mechanisms from samples. We identify a
parameterized family of mechanisms with strategically simple winner-pays-bid, all-pay, and …

This paper compares two leading approaches for robust optimization in the models of online
algorithms and mechanism design. Competitive analysis compares the performance of an …

We show that economic conclusions derived from Bulow and Roberts (1989) for linear utility
models approximately extend to non-linear utility models. Specifically, we quantify the extent …

This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, in which a single mechanism is
designed to achieve approximately optimal performance on every prior distribution from a …

In the era of Web3, decentralized technologies have emerged as the cornerstone of a new
digital paradigm. Backed by a decentralized blockchain architecture, the Web3 space aims …

The revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item to agents with independent but non-
identically distributed values is complex for agents with linear utility (Myerson, 1981) and …

The prior independent framework for algorithm design considers how well an algorithm that
does not know the distribution of its inputs approximates the expected performance of the …

We study auctions that are robust at any scale, ie, they can be applied for selling both
expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximations of the …