The allocation and exchange of discrete resources, such as transplant organs, public
housing, dormitory rooms, and many other resources for which agents have single‐unit …

When applying to a university, students and their parents devote considerable time
acquiring information about university programs in order to form preferences. We explore …

The attractive properties of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm rest on the assumption
of perfect information. Yet field studies of school matching show that information is imperfect …

School choice refers to policies that allow parents' preferences to be an input to the decision
of which school a student will attend. A rich body of research has developed over the past 10 …

I study costly information acquisition in a two-sided matching problem, such as matching
applicants to schools. An applicant's utility is a sum of common and idiosyncratic …

School choice and accountability are both mechanisms initially designed to improve
standards of education in publicly provided schools, although they have been introduced …

We consider matching-mechanism design in an environment in which agents acquire
information about their preferences endogenously. Information is costly; thus, agents acquire …

We introduce a new fairness criterion, order symmetry, for assignment mechanisms that
match n objects to n agents with ordinal preferences over the objects. An assignment …

In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools'
suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the …

A common assumption in matching markets is that both sides fully know their preferences.
However, when there are many participants this may be neither realistic nor feasible …