The mechanism design approach to student assignment involves the theoretical, empirical,
and experimental study of systems used to allocate students into schools around the world …

We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a
new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem …

School choice may lead to improvements in school productivity if parents' choices reward
effective schools and punish ineffective ones. This mechanism requires parents to choose …

We show that the vast majority of very high-achieving students who are low-income do not
apply to any selective college or university. This is despite the fact that selective institutions …

Parents gauge school quality in part by the level of student achievement and a school's
racial and socioeconomic mix. The importance of school characteristics in the housing …

Several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to
misrepresent their preferences. We find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in …

A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate
school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. Many of …

Each year approximately 10 million high school seniors in China compete for 6 million seats
through a centralized college admissions system. Within the last decade, many provinces …

Many school districts with centralized school choice adopt strategy-proof assignment
mechanisms to relieve applicants from needing to strategize based on beliefs about their …

We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching
mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is …