[图书][B] Too big to fail: The hazards of bank bailouts

GH Stern, RJ Feldman - 2004 - books.google.com
The potential failure of a large bank presents vexing questions for policymakers. It poses
significant risks to other financial institutions, to the financial system as a whole, and possibly …

Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises

W Wagner - Journal of financial intermediation, 2010 - Elsevier
It is widely believed that diversification at financial institutions benefits the stability of the
financial system. This paper shows that it also entails a cost: even though diversification …

The liquidity of bank assets and banking stability

W Wagner - Journal of Banking & Finance, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper shows that an increased liquidity of bank assets, paradoxically, increases
banking instability and the externalities associated with banking failures. This is because …

Bank runs and institutions: The perils of intervention

HM Ennis, T Keister - American Economic Review, 2009 - aeaweb.org
We study ex post efficient policy responses to a run on the banking system and the ex ante
incentives these responses create. We show that the efficient response to a run is typically …

Banks and liquidity creation: a simple exposition of the Diamond-Dybvig model

DW Diamond - FRB Richmond Economic Quarterly, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
This article uses narrative and numerical examples to exposit the ideas in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) and some recent extensions of their model. Banks create demand deposits to …

Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs

HM Ennis, T Keister - Journal of Economic Theory, 2003 - Elsevier
We construct an endogenous growth model in which bank runs occur with positive
probability in equilibrium. In this setting, a bank run has a permanent effect on the levels of …

Bank runs as coordination failures: An experimental study

R Garratt, T Keister - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2009 - Elsevier
We use experimental methods to investigate what factors contribute to breakdowns in
coordination among a bank's depositors. Subjects in our experiment decide whether to …

Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard

A Martin - Economic Theory, 2006 - Springer
In this paper I ask whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics
can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely …

Do social networks prevent or promote bank runs?

HJ Kiss, I Rodriguez-Lara, A Rosa-García - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2014 - Elsevier
We report experimental evidence on the effect of observability of actions on bank runs. We
model depositors' decision-making in a sequential framework, with three depositors located …

Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures

J Arifovic, JH Jiang, Y Xu - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2013 - Elsevier
We investigate how coordination requirement, measured by the coordination parameter,
affects the occurrence of miscoordination-based bank runs in controlled laboratory …