Bilevel programming problems
Bilevel optimization is a vital field of active research. Depending on its formulation it is part of
nonsmooth or nondifferentiable optimization, conic programming, optimization with …
nonsmooth or nondifferentiable optimization, conic programming, optimization with …
A short state of the art on multi-leader-follower games
D Aussel, A Svensson - Bilevel optimization: Advances and next …, 2020 - Springer
Abstract Multi-Leader-Follower games are complex optimization problems that mix a bilevel
structure with one or more Nash games. Such kinds of models have been already described …
structure with one or more Nash games. Such kinds of models have been already described …
Bilevel optimization: theory, algorithms, applications and a bibliography
S Dempe - Bilevel optimization: advances and next challenges, 2020 - Springer
Bilevel optimization problems are hierarchical optimization problems where the feasible
region of the so-called upper level problem is restricted by the graph of the solution set …
region of the so-called upper level problem is restricted by the graph of the solution set …
Water integration in eco-industrial parks using a multi-leader-follower approach
The design and optimization of industrial water networks in eco-industrial parks are studied
by formulating and solving multi-leader-follower game problems. The methodology is …
by formulating and solving multi-leader-follower game problems. The methodology is …
Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market: Part 1–existence and characterization
D Aussel, P Bendotti, M Pištěk - Optimization, 2017 - Taylor & Francis
We consider a model of a pay-as-bid electricity market based on a multi-leader-common-
follower approach where the producers as leaders are at the upper level and the regulator …
follower approach where the producers as leaders are at the upper level and the regulator …
Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid electricity market part 2-best response of a producer
D Aussel, P Bendotti, M Pištěk - Optimization, 2017 - Taylor & Francis
We consider a multi-leader-common-follower model of a pay-as-bid electricity market in
which the producers provide the regulator with either linear or quadratic bids. We prove that …
which the producers provide the regulator with either linear or quadratic bids. We prove that …
A bridge between bilevel programs and Nash games
L Lampariello, S Sagratella - Journal of Optimization Theory and …, 2017 - Springer
We study connections between optimistic bilevel programming problems and generalized
Nash equilibrium problems. We remark that, with respect to bilevel problems, we consider …
Nash equilibrium problems. We remark that, with respect to bilevel problems, we consider …
On M-stationarity conditions in MPECs and the associated qualification conditions
Depending on whether a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) is
considered in its original or its enhanced (via KKT conditions) form, the assumed …
considered in its original or its enhanced (via KKT conditions) form, the assumed …
Deregulated electricity markets with thermal losses and production bounds: models and optimality conditions
D Aussel, M Červinka, M Marechal - RAIRO-Operations Research, 2016 - rairo-ro.org
A multi-leader-common-follower game formulation has been recently used by many authors
to model deregulated electricity markets. In our work, we first propose a model for the case of …
to model deregulated electricity markets. In our work, we first propose a model for the case of …
[HTML][HTML] Strictly and Γ-robust counterparts of electricity market models: Perfect competition and Nash–Cournot equilibria
A Kramer, V Krebs, M Schmidt - Operations Research Perspectives, 2021 - Elsevier
This paper mainly studies two topics: linear complementarity problems for modeling
electricity market equilibria and optimization under uncertainty. We consider both perfectly …
electricity market equilibria and optimization under uncertainty. We consider both perfectly …