Purpose It has been two decades since the first academic paper shone a spotlight on non-
GAAP earnings. The past 20 years of research investigates concerns over the misuse of …

This study examines how the board of directors'(BOD) incentives reflected by pay structure
influence diverse measures of firm performance under contingencies. We integrate the …

We examine how exogenous changes in analyst coverage influence (1) the likelihood that
managers will voluntarily disclose customized (non-GAAP) performance metrics and (2) the …

We investigate whether firms change their non-GAAP reporting practices after debt covenant
violations. We find that the likelihood that a firm will disclose non-GAAP earnings decreases …

We examine the effect of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on non-GAAP earnings
disclosures. Prior literature documents that voluntary clawback adoption improves financial …

We examine whether the dispersion of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) amongst the top
management team (TMT) impacts the likelihood of firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings and …

CEOs of S&P 500 firms that report high non-GAAP earnings relative to GAAP earnings
receive substantial unexplained pay. Crucially, this result remains even after controlling for …

This study examines the association between managerial short‐termism and financial
statement comparability. Using a short‐termism measure constructed through textual …

Many companies regularly disclose non‐GAAP performance measures to communicate firm‐
specific information that does not fit within the mold of GAAP reporting. However, these non …

We document excessive CEO pay of almost two million dollars per year, on average, for the
S&P 500 firms that report high non-GAAP earnings relative to GAAP earnings. These firms …